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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 
Evaluating Human Rights in Africa: 
Some Problems of Implicit Comparisons 
Rhoda Howard 
Since the 1970s, many humanistically minded academics have become con- 
cerned with the comparative measurement and analysis of human rights. 
The new concern is partly a result of the introduction of human rights as a 
subject of United Nations debates and foreign policy deliberations, espe- 
cially in the United States during the Carter Administration (1977-81). Fre- 
quently, on the intergovernmental and national levels, the debate is nothing 
more than a new means of rhetoric, with an additional patina of moral con- 
cern, for asserting a nation-state's normal national security interests. 
In the United Nations and other such fora, a favorite tactic of debate is 
to compare one's own country's human rights strengths with another coun- 
try's human rights weaknesses. Thus socialist countries criticize the lack of 
welfare security in capitalist countries, while the latter reply with an indict- 
ment of the lack of civil liberties in the former. Former imperialist powers 
criticize the human rights practices of their former colonies. Developed 
countries and underdeveloped countries are also compared, almost inevi- 
tably to the latters' disadvantage. Finally, since no country has completely 
lived up to the United Nations ideal as embodied in the International Bill of 
Rights,' it is fair game for adversaries to hold up that ideal as a mirror to 
reflect human rights abuses. 
In this paper, I illustrate the problems of how implicit human rights com- 
parisons affect one's evaluations of human rights performance, by discussing 
1. The International Bill of Human Rights comprises three sets of standards. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948; G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. 
Doc. A/810 (1948). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
opened for signature 19 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976; G.A. Res. 
2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976; G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 52, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
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the kinds of comparisons to which Africa is often subject. I refer for factual 
examples to a select group of sub-Saharan African countries, namely, Gam- 
bia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia - all (presently or formerly) English-speaking countries, colonized by 
the United Kingdom, which obtained their independence in the early 1960s. 
In the course of my research 2 on human rights in these countries, I have 
become aware that my evaluation of their performance depends partly on 
my implicit comparisons with performance in other times and places. If I 
judge the nine countries against the human rights ideal as expressed in the 
International Bill of Rights, they fare quite poorly. They fare quite poorly also 
if I compare them with developed Western democracies or with their 
"mother country," Britain, in the contemporary period. But if I compare 
them with the now-developed world as it was two or three hundred years 
ago, i.e., at a similar "state" of economic development and nation-building, 
they fare much better. If I compare them with themselves under the colonial 
period, they also fare quite well. If I compare them with themselves in their 
own political-cultural past (in the precolonial period), the evaluation is 
mixed. 
One needs, then, to be aware of the comparisons one is making. All 
evaluations of human rights in specific nation-states contain implicit com- 
parisons, either with some philosophical and judicial ideal or with human 
rights in selected other nation-states. Comparisons are useful: they can help 
to measure realizations as well as abuses of human rights and to come up 
with realistic assessments of what is possible and probable. An historical 
sense will facilitate measurement of past progress and will make predictions 
possible. Social or cultural comparisons will facilitate a sense of how needs, 
wants, and rights are reinterpreted as societies change; such comparisons 
will also remove the stress from ethnic or regional peculiarities (e.g., 
"African" versus "Western") and instead stress similarities and differences of 
social organization. 
I illustrate below how one's implicit evaluations of human rights in 
English-speaking sub-Saharan Africa can change, depending on the com- 
parison one makes. 
COMPARING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA WITH THE IDEAL 
The internationally recognized ideal of human rights is the International Bill 
of Rights, a package of rights which has been progressively defined by the 
United Nations since 1948. As is well known, the two 1966 Covenants pro- 
2. See Rhoda Howard, "The Dilemma of Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa," International 
Journal 35 (Autumn 1980), 724-747, and other references below. 
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vide the basic list of rights in the international human rights package, 
although a number of supplementary instruments elaborate specific rights.3 
The criticisms of the practice of deriving human rights ideals from 
United Nations standards are well-known. First, United Nations practice in 
enumerating lists of rights is hardly that of an independent, unbiased body of 
thinkers. The United Nations is a political body which is not universal, even 
in 1983, in its membership. At the time the Universal Declaration was for- 
mulated, the Third World carried considerably less influence within the 
organization than it does today. The two Covenants derived from the 
Declaration were products of the Cold War era; thus, especially at the urg- 
ings of the United States (which has yet to ratify either Covenant), so-called 
civil and political rights were split off from so-called economic, social, and 
cultural rights.4 Aside from these obvious political biases, United Nations 
practice can result in selective international condemnation of some regimes, 
e.g., South Africa, but nary a slap on the hand for others, e.g., Amin's 
Uganda.s 
These biases in the formulation of ideals are reflected in the actual con- 
tent of the Covenants. Africans frequently draw attention to the imbalance 
between expecting immediate implementation of civil and political rights 
(Civil-Political Covenant, Article 3), but only gradual implementation of 
economic, social, and cultural rights (Economic-Social-Cultural Covenant, 
Article 2(1)). Surely, many Africans argue, the latter rights should take prior- 
ity over the former in their poverty-stricken, underdeveloped countries.6 
The huge list of rights in the two covenants is also criticized: even within the 
two categories the lists contain no priorities (other than the distinction 
between those rights that are derogable in times of officially declared 
national emergencies and those that are not [Civil-Political Covenant, Article 
4]). Hence the new interest in discussing both basic needs as an economic 
strategy 7 and basic rights as a political strategy. Should, for example, the 
country which (without a national emergency) violates Article 25(b) of the 
3. See generally Richard B. Lillich, International Human Rights Instruments (Buffalo, N.Y.: 
William S. Hein Co., 1983). 
4. Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), 6. 
5. On the double standard with regard to violations of human rights in Africa, see Warren 
Weinstein, "Africa's Approach to Human Rights at the United Nations," Issue 6 (Winter 
1976), 14-21, and A. Glenn Mower, Jr., "Human Rights in Black Africa: A Double Stan- 
dard?" Human Rights Journal 9 (January-March 1976), 39-70. 
6. For an eloquent statement on civil-political versus economic rights, see Julius K. Nyerere, 
"Stability and Change in Africa" (an address at the University of Toronto, 1969), reprinted 
in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record (London: Rex Collings), vol. 2 
(1969-70), C30-31. 
7. The World Bank is particularly interested in the basic-needs approach to development, as 
numerous articles, especially in World Development, attest. See, e.g., Paul Streeten, 
"Basic Needs and Human Rights," World Development 8 (1980), 107-111, and Shahid 
Javed Burki and Mahbub UI Haq, "Meeting Basic Needs: An Overview," World Develop- 
ment 9 (1981), 167-182. 
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Civil-Political Covenant, regarding "genuine periodic elections," be criticized 
as severely as the country which violates Article 7, regarding the right not to 
be tortured? Should the right to work under Article 6 of the Economic-Social- 
Cultural Covenant be as important as the right to eat under Article 11? 
Yet it is somewhat specious to continue making the above criticisms of 
biases in human rights standards in the 1980s; for in the 1970s, the Third 
World members of the U.N. made a concerted effort to rectify the perceived 
bias toward political, as against economic, rights. The effort was successful, 
indeed perhaps too successful, as there is now a general trend to assert that 
political rights and civil liberties must wait until economic rights have been 
realized.8 This trend can be seen most clearly in the calls for a New Interna- 
tional Economic Order (N.I.E.O.) beginning in 1974.9 The most important of 
the numerous documents agreed upon since 1974 was a 1977 U.N. resolu- 
tion, "Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United 
Nations system for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms."10 This resolution stated that equal attention ought 
to be given to civil-political and economic-social-cultural rights.11 It then 
went on, however, to say that in the U.N. system, priority with regard to 
human rights ought to be given to questions of national sovereignty 12 and to 
the realization of the N.I.E.O.13 It further requested the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights to accept these priorities, presumably over its other concerns. 
Thus the U.N. system was deflected from investigating individual human 
rights in the civil and political sphere: the cynic might perhaps conclude that 
Third World elites, by refocusing U.N. standard-setting activities onto the 
realm of international inequalities, had preserved their own opportunities for 
internal inequalities and denial of political rights. 
Some Africans might well counter such a cynical interpretation by point- 
ing out that there is, in their view, another inherent bias in the U.N. human 
rights ideals, that of stressing individual over group rights. This criticism is 
both political and cultural. Politically, it is based on the view that over the 
last five centuries, the most immense, systematic, and brutal violations of 
human rights in Africa have been those of the international slave trade, colo- 
nialism, and apartheid. Insofar as apartheid still exists and insofar as colonial- 
ism is perpetuated by allegedly neocolonial economic strategies, then in the 
8. For my own views on this subject, see Rhoda Howard, "The Full-Belly Thesis: Should 
Economic Rights Take Priority over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan 
Africa," Human Rights Quarterly 5 (November 1983), 467-490. 
9. U.N. General Assembly, "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order," Resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 (General Assembly, 6th Special 
Session), in U.N., Resolutions 14 (1972-74), 527-529. 
10. U.N. General Assembly, Resolution 32/130 (1977), in U.N., Resolutions and Decisions (20 
September-21 December 1977), Supp. 45, at 150-151. 
11. Ibid., art. 1(a). 
12. Ibid., art. 1(e). 
13. Ibid., art. 1(f). 
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African view the onus for rectifying human rights abuses in Africa lies 
especially on the Western, developed world to compensate for past and 
present injustices and inequalities. Culturally, the argument is that Africans 
are not individualists, that they are much more group- or community- 
oriented than Westerners. Thus, Africans maintain, much of the Civil- 
Political Covenant ought not to apply to them. 
This African criticism of the U.N. ideal is now embodied in the 1981 
African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights.14 The addition of peoples' 
rights, even in the very title of this African Charter, marks it off from all other 
regional charters of rights, such as the European and American Conven- 
tions.15 If the African Charter is taken as the new, relevant ideal to which 
practice in individual African states must adhere, then the African human 
rights record will be substantially better than if it is compared with the U.N. 
ideal. 
There have been, for example, some severe ethnic persecutions in inde- 
pendent English-speaking sub-Saharan Africa. These include Idi Amin's 
appalling slaughter of specific ethnic groups such as the Acholi and the 
Langi 16 and the Kenyan persecution of ethnic Somalis in the 1960s.17 But, 
overall, the cultural integrity of minority ethnic groups has been subject to 
far less attack than one might expect of new nation-states, even in cases of 
secessionism (the Igbo of Nigeria) or irredentism (the Ewe of Ghana 18). This 
does not mean that such groups have suffered no prejudice or discrimina- 
tion. The Nigerian civil war began after up to fifty thousand Igbo (Biafrans) 
were slaughtered in the north in 1966. After the Biafran secessionists were 
defeated in 1970, the Igbo were rapidly reintegrated into national life; but 
they still suffer discrimination both from their former enemies and from 
inhabitants of minority (non-lgbo) areas of eastern Nigeria.19 There is no 
14. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted by the O.A.U. Summit at 
Nairobi, Kenya, 27 June 1981; O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, rev. 5; reprinted in Interna- 
tional Legal Materials 21 (1982), 58. [Editor's note: see B. Obinna Okere, "The Protection 
of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights," 
Human Rights Quarterly, this issue.] 
15. For an analysis of the African Charter and comparison with other regional charters, see 
Okere, note 14 above, and Richard Gittleman, "The Banjul Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis," in Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Ron I. Meltzer, eds., 
Human Rights and Development in Africa (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York 
Press, 1984). 
16. The Langi are the ethnic group to which Milton Obote, Amin's predecessor and suc- 
cessor, belongs. For accounts of the slaughter of these and other ethnic groups in Uganda, 
see Africa Contemporary Record 4 (1971-72), B229, and id. 5-11 (1972-73 to 1978-79), 
sections on Uganda. 
17. Amnesty International, Annual Reports, "Kenya," 1966-67, 1967-68, 1968-69. In 
February 1970, amnesty was granted to all political offenders in the North-East Province. 
Africa Contemporary Record 2 (1969-70), B128. 
18. Africa Contemporary Record 6 (1973-74), B651; id. 7 (1974-75), B643; id. 8 (1975-76), 
B696. 
19. Id. 3 (1970-71), B415; id. 4 (1971-72), B646. 
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guarantee that ethnic slaughter will not occur again in Nigeria, especially if 
economic conditions continue to worsen. Similarly in Ghana, the Ewe of the 
Volta Region have long been used as ethnic scapegoats. Some Ewe leaders 
were sentenced to death for subversion during the Acheampong military 
regime (1972-79) in Ghana, but the sentences were never carried out.20 
Nevertheless, rumors of Ewe conspiracies continue to circulate in Ghana in 
the 1980s. 
Despite these examples of severe ethnic conflict, one rarely finds in 
Africa deliberate wholesale slaughter of ethnic groups (as, for example, the 
slaughter of American Indians during the period of colonization of North 
America), nor does one find concerted attempts to eliminate ethnic 
languages or religious practices. The emphasis on group rights in the African 
ideal both reinforces the claims of African nation-states vis-a-vis the Western- 
dominated world economy and encourages the rights of subnational 
cultural groups within Africa. 
Yet the African Rights Charter, like the U.N. standards, is a political 
document, emanating from the Organization of African Unity, whose 
Charter has itself been criticized for being little more than a formulation of 
rights for heads of state.21 The African Rights Charter's underplaying of indi- 
vidual rights allows for considerable abuse of those rights enshrined in the 
Civil-Political Covenant. The question arises, therefore, which ideal is one to 
choose as a basis for one's measurement of human rights guarantees or 
abuses? Does one choose the "universal" U.N. package or the "specific" 
African package? If one opts for specificity of rights, then to what are they 
specific: to continent, to nation-state, to "race" or ethnic-cultural group? Can 
generalizations about human rights be made outside of specificities of place, 
time, and "level of development"? 
Academics cannot limit their analyses of human rights to comparisons 
with international human rights documents. Insofar as all of these 
documents are essentially political treaties based on compromise and con- 
sensus (and indeed, some skeptics would argue, nation-states' guarantees 
not to rock each others' respective boats), they are neither in the 
philosophical nor the sociological sense universally valid documents. 
Similarly, to criticize African or indeed any other national, regional, or con- 
tinental human rights practices on the bases of these documents is to beg the 
question of whether human rights are culturally specific as well as the ques- 
tion of whether poor or newly developing countries may be held to the 
20. Amnesty International, "Report on the Death Penalty: Ghana" (1979). The Ewe prisoners, 
sentenced in August 1976, were released in 1978. 
21. See Charter of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U. Charter), adopted 23 May 1963; 
479 U.N.T.S. 39 (1963); reprinted in International Legal Materials 2 (1963), 766. Olajide 
Aluko, "The Organisation of African Unity and Human Rights," The Round Table 283 (July 
1981), 240, quotes Kwame Nkrumah as having referred to the O.A.U. as "a trade union of 
African presidents." 
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same standards as wealthy, developed countries. Human rights abuses are 
not merely the result of lack of political will or selfish unwillingness to give 
up elite pleasures. Judgments must be historically based, must compare 
groups at similar levels of social evolution or development, and must take 
into account different cultural traditions. 
COMPARING AFRICA WITH WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 
A second implicit comparison which African and Western scholars make is 
evaluation of human rights in the Third World against human rights stan- 
dards in Western democracies. In general, African and other Third World 
countries fare quite poorly in such comparisons. Western democracies 
allow high levels of individual civil and political rights, and can afford a high 
level of social security guarantees of basic economic needs, as well as social 
and cultural rights. 
The evaluation of human rights in Africa in comparison with the U.N. 
ideal can at least be justified on the ground that the U.N. standards represent 
a minimum international moral consensus constantly being reevaluated and 
adjusted as more Third World input into that forum augments understanding 
of the peculiar constraints of economic underdevelopment and past political 
colonialism. The U.N. ideal is just that, an ideal toward which Third World 
nations can strive at a pace which takes into account their problems of 
development. The Western comparison, on the contrary, is abstracted from 
both history and economics. It presents as a matter of Western moral com- 
mitment and political will what is in fact a matter of enormous economic 
advantage and centuries of class, ethnic, racial - and now sexual - conflict. 
A common means which Third World nations employ to reply to what 
they rightly consider to be unfair comparisons with Western nations in the 
area of human rights is to point out the deficiencies in human rights practices 
which still exist in Western democracies. Underlying these defensive 
criticisms is a sense of the biases which still exist in the liberal ideal of human 
rights, even though the original liberal ideal has been supplemented in the 
last hundred years by a growing quasisocialist sense of the state's moral 
burden to provide for basic welfare rights for all its citizens. The Western 
world still stresses the rights of formal political participation and judicial 
equality, emerging from the French and American revolutions, over the 
rights of economic equality emerging from Marxism and the Soviet and 
Chinese revolutions, as well as over the late twentieth-century concern for 
new "solidarity" rights such as the right to peace and to a healthy environ- 
ment. It also stresses, again, individual over group rights. 
The differences in human rights philosophies of the Third World and the 
Western world reflect not only differences in ideologies, but also differences 
in historical experiences and in present forms of social organization. The 
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Western stress on individual political liberties and rights under the law 
emerged from the struggle of the capitalist bourgeoisie to assert its indepen- 
dence against the kings and feudal nobilities of early modern Europe.22 The 
mode of economic organization was individual ownership of land and 
capital along with private employment of labor alienated from the means of 
production. By contrast, in most new African states there is either a mixed 
economy with a procapitalist bent, as in Nigeria; a heavily nationalized state- 
capitalist economy, as in Zambia; or a protosocialist economy, as in Tan- 
zania. 
The demands on these economies are heavy. Rapid decolonization in 
the 1960s was accompanied by rash promises by the new political elites to 
grant all of the economic demands which a "revolution of rising expecta- 
tions" had generated among local populations. The economic expectations 
of the newly freed masses who were the bases of the new elites' political 
support combined with the ancient African belief in the moral value of 
economic redistribution to result in a heavy political stress on the "group 
right" of economic welfare. Unfortunately, however, the new African 
governments have neither the economic nor the administrative resources 
(regardless of political will) to fulfill welfare demands. Basic communication 
and transportation infrastructures do not exist, nor does a tax base which 
can support complete social security. Human capital resources are scarce, 
and the bureaucracy is in its infancy. 
What confronts Africa, therefore, is precarious elite rule which can 
justify itself and maintain itself in power only by fulfilling at least some of the 
massive demands upon it for economic growth, equitable distribution of 
wealth, basic welfare servicing, and civil and political freedom; in other 
words, for the rapid creation of a society which approximates those of the 
Western world today. But how did the Western world itself achieve its envi- 
able human rights position? If Africa is to achieve what the Western world 
has achieved, then it must study the methods by which those achievements 
came about. Perhaps the more realistic comparison to be made, therefore, is 
that of late twentieth-century Africa with Western Europe at a similar stage of 
economic and political development. 
The major tasks which new African states face are twofold. The first is 
the political consolidation of a nation-state in the face, especially, of par- 
ticularistic ethnic loyalties and, in some countries, regional rivalries 
heightened by inequitable economic development under British rule. In 
comparisons of African with Western human rights, it is often forgotten that 
during Europe's own stage of nation-building, massive violations of what we 
would now consider elementary human rights occurred. In Britain and 
France, for example, local-language speakers were forced by law and 
22. Michael E. Tigar and Madeleine R. Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1977). 
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violence to adopt the new "national" languages.23 Religious wars occurred; 
Catholic and Protestant states were carved out; and extreme religious devi- 
ants such as the Moors in Spain and the ubiquitous Jews were either 
expelled, confined to ghettoes, or murdered. "National" cultures were, in 
other words, secured by brute force, in the absence of any moral concern 
for freedom of speech, religion, or political participation. 
By contrast, African states are faced with the task of forging nations out 
of often recalcitrant local populations while guaranteeing a host of civil and 
political freedoms which allow for local criticisms, participation, and defense 
of subnational "group rights." The international and indigenous expectation, 
moreover, is that this creation of nationhood should be accomplished liter- 
ally overnight. To function effectively in the modern international economy, 
Africa must be organized on the basis of definite geographical boundaries; 
rules of commerce must apply everywhere within each geographic entity; 
and both foreign visitors and urban administrators expect to find uniformity 
of laws, language, and customs wherever they go. The task of nation- 
building might be slightly easier in Africa if the boundaries presently being 
consolidated had emerged from centuries of indigenous political conflict, as 
they did in Europe; if, for example, the Ashanti had indeed expanded all 
over Ghana and into Ivory Coast and Togo; if the Kenyan Somalis were actu- 
ally resident in Somalia; if the Buganda kingdom had expanded and con- 
quered the small ethnic groups surrounding it; if northern, western, and 
eastern Nigeria had evolved as three different countries. But in Africa, the 
ruling elites must forge a sense of nationhood out of artificially imposed 
geographical boundaries while facing human rights constraints and 
possibilities of international moral censure which were unknown at the time 
of the European consolidations. 
The second problem which African governments face is that they are 
obliged to implement, as soon as possible, a whole range of "new" rights 
which were unknown in Europe until the early twentieth century. In the civil 
and political realm, they were obliged to grant all of the rights which evolved 
in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as the right to an 
independent judiciary and the right to formal political participation.24 But 
they are also obliged to grant all of the new twentieth-century rights. For 
example, there is pressure upon them to liberalize a whole host of traditional 
customs in the direction of individual women's autonomy: 25 this pressure 
23. On France, see Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural 
France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), chap. 6, "A Wealth of 
Tongues." 
24. On the granting of basic civil-political rights in Europe, see Robert Justin Goldstein, 
"Political Repression and Political Development: The 'Human Rights' Issue in Nineteenth 
Century Europe," in Richard F. Thomasson, ed., Comparative Social Research, vol. 4 
(Greenwich, Conn.: Jai Press, 1981), 161-198. 
25. Rhoda Howard, "Human Rights and Personal Law: Women in Sub-Saharan Africa," Issue 
12 (Spring-Summer 1982), 45-52. 
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emanates both from international ideological criticism and from the prefer- 
ences of urban, westernized elite African women. African governments are 
also obliged to grant rights to refugees and aliens, even though international 
obligations toward refugees principally emerged in the period after World 
War I 26 and even though the refugee burden in Africa is higher than in any 
other continent.27 The African expulsions of ethnic minorities (such as that of 
the Asians from Uganda and Kenya), or indeed of other African aliens (such 
as the expulsion of 100,000 people from Ghana in 1970 28), and the expul- 
sion of two million people from Nigeria in 1983 parallel European ethnic 
expulsions of earlier times. Unlike Europe, however, Africa has no colonies 
to which to send its ethnic minorities or its surplus labor. The insistence on 
universality of political rights in Africa, a very late development in the 
Western democracies, constitutes a considerable political cost to the new 
African nation-states and especially to their new elites. 
Finally, African governments have accepted that it is their immediate 
obligation to institute economic development (loosely comprising absolute 
economic growth, redistribution of wealth, and increased national 
autonomy) as soon as possible. They have accepted in principle the entire 
burden of the welfare society, as defined not only by the Western capitalist 
world, but more comprehensively by socialist Europe; hence, for example, 
the right to work, not guaranteed in welfare societies in the West, is 
guaranteed in some African constitutions.29 Such economic obligations were 
not deemed to be part of the state's duties in Europe until well after national 
consolidation had taken place and basic civil and political rights had been 
awarded (to men only) after a long period of class struggle. Moreover, 
Europe and North America had at their command, when they began to 
implement welfare policies, the accumulated wealth of four centuries of 
imperialism and industrialization. With far fewer resources, African govern- 
ments are attempting to implement much more in the way of economic 
rights, within a much shorter, indeed a comparatively minuscule, period of 
time. 
A comparison of human rights in Africa in the 1980s with human rights 
in the Western world at similar stages of national consolidation and 
26. See Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, vol. 1 (Leyden: A. W. 
Sijthoff, 1966), 9-27, and vol. 2 (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972), 17-23. See also Louise W. 
Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time, vols. 1 and 2 (Methuen, N.J.: Scarecrow 
Press, 1975). 
27. Rhoda Howard, "The Canadian Government Response to Africa's Refugee Problem," 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 15 (1981), 95-116. 
28. Margaret Peil, "The Expulsion of West African Aliens," Journal of Modern African Studies 9 
(1971), 205-229. 
29. The Constitution of Tanzania (1979), "Forward: the Foundations of the Constitution," sec- 
tion C(IV), states that "every community has the duty.. . to ensure that . . every man 
[sic] able to work does work ..." The Constitution of Nigeria (1979), art. 17(3)(a), 
specifies that all citizens are to have adequate means of livelihood and "adequate oppor- 
tunities to secure suitable employment." 
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economic development is, then, must more appropriate than a comparison 
of Africa with contemporary Western societies. Such sociologically relevant 
comparison will reveal the disadvantages under which Africa labors: fewer 
resources combined with much higher human rights expectations. With 
such a comparison in mind, we can ask what is reasonable to expect of new 
African nation-states, rather than merely enumerating the ways in which 
Africa has failed to live up to universal or Western ideals of human rights. 
COMPARISON WITH AFRICA UNDER COLONIAL RULE 
A minor variant of the comparison of African human rights with contem- 
porary Western human rights is the comparison of postcolonial with colonial 
Africa. The opinion is sometimes expressed that English-speaking Africa was 
better off, regarding human rights, under British rule than it is under indig- 
enous African rule. This position implicitly reflects a concern for political 
stability as the overriding priority of human rights. 
It is true that, once Africa had been successfully conquered and all 
resistance overcome, British rule was relatively benign. The history of the 
conquest itself, however, reveals massive violations of the right to life and 
liberty.30 The British could be quite ruthless in their suppression of even the 
slightest resistance. For example, Sir Garnet Wolseley, the hero of the 1874 
conquest of Ashanti, had the Ashanti capital of Kumasi burned to the 
ground.31 In Kenya, another country taken through active warfare, every 
person in the market of the village of Muruka was slaughtered in vengeance 
for the killing of one British soldier in 1902.32 Recalcitrant chiefs were 
routinely exiled (as was the Asantehene, or king, of Ashanti as well as the 
Kabaka of Buganda) or detained. The Maxim gun was used in Africa as early 
as the 1890s against indigenous Ugandan and Tanzanian resistance.33 That 
such brutality was not confined merely to the nineteenth-century imperialist 
phase is evidenced by the massive incarcerations of "Mau Mau" rebels in 
Kenya in the 1950s and confinement of African women and children to "pro- 
tective" concentration camps.34 
Civil and political rights as the contemporary world now defines them 
were certainly not practiced under colonial rule; indeed, the British resisted 
the inclusion of a provision in the Civil-Political Covenant obliging them to 
implement those rights in their colonies.35 The practice of preventive deten- 
30. Michael Crowder, ed., West African Resistance: The Military Response to Colonial Occu- 
pation (London: Hutchinson, 1971), and Henry S. Wilson, The Imperial Experience in 
Sub-Saharan Africa since 1870 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977). 
31. Crowder, note 30 above, 42. 
32. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Detained: A Writer's Prison Diary (London: Heinemann, 1981), 35. 
33. John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Random House, 1975), 88. 
34. Ngugi, note 32 above, 49. 
35. James Frederick Green, The United Nations and Human Rights (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institute, 1956), 55-57. 
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tion, now a favorite weapon of African governments against their oppo- 
nents, is a direct heritage of the colonial era 36 carried over from British and 
colonial law into the independence constitutions.37 There was no political 
participation to speak of in colonial Africa. A few African members were 
allowed into the Legislative Councils of Ghana 38 and Sierra Leone 39 as early 
as the 1920s, but all decisions of such councils could be overridden by the 
colonial executive and the colonial secretary. In other countries, admission 
of Africans into legislative councils was delayed until the 1940s or 1950s.40 
These African members were appointed, not elected (except for a few 
municipal seats); thus ordinary Africans had no political rights whatsoever. 
Nor was there any real independence of the judiciary. The local district com- 
missioner was normally prosecutor, judge, and jury- in short, a benign, 
patriarchal "great white father." Only in the higher courts and the urban 
areas was separation of judiciary from the other organs of government 
established. 
In the economic field, the British practiced forced labor until well into 
the 1920s.41 During World War I, West Africans forcibly recruited into the 
British army's carrier corps died by the thousands from exhaustion, inade- 
quate provisioning, and unhealthy living conditions.42 Trade unions were 
not permitted until the 1920s; and when they did exist, they had very few 
rights.43 In Kenya, hundreds of thousands of Africans were expelled from 
their land to make way for white settlers, and African peasants were forbid- 
den to grow profitable crops, such as coffee, in competition with the 
whites.44 Generally speaking, the colonial state assumed no obligation for 
36. See Ngugi, note 32 above, 44-51, for a discussion of Kenyan resistance leaders detained 
under British rule. For an autobiographical account by a Kenyan detainee, see Josiah 
Mwangi Kariuki, "Mau Mau" Detainee (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). 
37. See James W. Skelton, Jr., "Standards of Procedural Due Process under International Law 
vs. Preventive Detention in Selected African States," Houston Journal of International Law 
2 (Spring 1980), 314, and "Ghana's Preventive Detention Act," Journal of the International 
Commission of Jurists 3 (Winter 1961), 71. 
38. A. K. P. Kludze, "Ghana [Constitutional History]," in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. 
Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana 
Publications, October 1982), 4. 
39. W. S. Marcus Jones and G. F. A. Sawyerr, "Sierra Leone [Constitutional History]," in 
Blaustein and Flanz, note 38 above (June 1979), 3. 
40. For details of each country, see Blaustein and Flanz, note 38 above. 
41. On Ghana, see Roger G. Thomas, "Forced Labour in British West Africa: The Case of the 
Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 1906-1927," Journal of African History 14 (1973), 
79-103; see also the account of forced labor, by A. T. Nzula, I. I. Potekhin, and A. Z. 
Zusmanovich, Forced Labour in Colonial Africa (London: Zed Press, 1979; originally 
published 1933). 
42. David Killingray and James Matthews, "Beasts of Burden: British West African Carriers in 
the First World War," Canadian journal of African Studies 13 (1979), 5-23. 
43. See Nzula, Potekhin, and Zusmanovich, note 41 above, 119; see also Sharon Stichter, 
"The Formation of a Working Class in Kenya," in Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen, 
eds., The Development of an African Working Class (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1975), 43-44. 
44. E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (London: Heinemann, 
1973), 208. 
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economic development or economic rights until 1939, when the exigencies 
of wartime production forced more rational consideration of all British 
resources. Nor was there any notion that the British should ensure in their 
colonies even the limited range of social welfare provisions which existed at 
home. 
In the cultural field, the British, perhaps unintentionally, undermined 
local pride and dignity by the introduction of Christian churches and 
mission-run schools. There African members of a putative urban elite 
learned to imitate whites in dress and manner, and to denigrate their own 
cultural heritage. Cultural diffusion, in which Africans might have made their 
own choices about which aspects of Western mores they wished to adopt, 
was accompanied by cultural compulsion; the price of schooling was con- 
version to Christianity. Newly Westernized "young men" challenged the 
authority of their elders, while the relatively high status of women in indig- 
enous African societies was eroded by the imposition of Western patriarchal 
ideals. In defense of the British, it can be said that African languages were 
not formally abolished, nor were indigenous religions disallowed (except 
when their provisions, e.g., infanticide of twins or trial by ordeal, were 
deemed contrary to "natural justice"45). Yet racial discrimination was com- 
monplace. Indeed, Jomo Kenyatta, then President of Kenya, could still rouse 
a cheer from the popular masses in the 1970s by explaining that the African 
elite now owned the best land, shops, and homes, formerly for whites 
only.46 
This short description of human rights under British rule serves to illus- 
trate that the colonial power was not concerned to grant to its colonial sub- 
jects the rights of citizens in the mother country, even given the limited 
definition of human rights which prevailed at the time. What the British did 
do during the colonial period was to eliminate all overt interethnic conflict; 
to abolish, where it existed, African domestic slavery; and to stop the expan- 
sion of African empires. Thus a great deal of political conflict which might 
have occurred in a noncolonized Africa was deflected, only to emerge, in 
sometimes more violent form, in the postcolonial period. Although 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Ashanti expansionism seems to have 
been completely quelled by British rule in Ghana, the smaller ethnic groups' 
fears of Buganda power in Uganda have been a prime cause of the intense 
postcolonial civil conflict. In Nigeria, the power of the northern Islamic 
empires was temporarily checked by British rule, only to emerge after 1960 
against the challenge of the new Westernized Igbo with their dominant posi- 
tions in trade, the professions, and the bureaucracy. 
45. All Africa Council of Churches, "Factors Responsible for the Violation of Human Rights in 
Africa, Issues 6 (Winter 1976), 44, and David Westerlund, "Freedom of Religion under 
Socialist Rule in Tanzania," Journal of Church and State 24 (Winter 1982), 93. 
46. "The President's Kenyatta Day Speech: Warning to Opponents" (reported on Radio 
Nairobi, 20 October 1972), Africa Contemporary Record 5 (1972-73), C128. 
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To compare human rights in contemporary Africa unfavorably with 
human rights in the colonial period, therefore, is to concentrate on a very 
limited range of "rights," namely, peace, relative predictability, and "benign 
neglect" of indigenous ethnic groupings. In a country as wracked by internal 
tensions as Uganda has been since 1969, such elementary rights are valued 
indeed; the British did not murder individuals merely on the basis of their 
ethnicity, and once their conquest was assured, peace did reign within the 
narrow confines of paternalistic dictatorship. But were the British still in 
power today, the narrowness of the range of rights they allowed and 
planned for would be even more obvious than it was during the nationalist 
agitation of the 1950s and 1960s. The new states of postcolonial Africa have 
assumed responsibility for massive development and social welfare pro- 
grams; programs undreamed of during colonial rule. Their failure to imple- 
ment these programs causes political unrest which often results in state 
repression. Such repression may not differ in degree from that practiced by 
the British, but it does differ in kind. More is expected of independent 
African governments by way of civil and political rights than was ever 
expected of the British; thus the independent governments' attacks on those 
rights appear, to the internal and the international observer, much worse 
than the British outright denial of them. 
COMPARISONS WITH PRECOLONIAL AFRICA 
Several African writers 47 contend that there is a uniquely African concept of 
human rights, that is, that concepts of human rights are culturally specific, 
not universal. Hence the Universal Declaration of Human Rights cannot be 
applied to the African continent without substantial modification, despite 
the Organization of African Unity's having endorsed the Declaration and 
despite the standard list of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
included in many African constitutions.48 To support their contention, these 
writers refer to a model of precolonial African society which, they maintain, 
is still the backbone of African ways of thinking and of African social organi- 
47. See especially Dunstan M. Wai, "Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Adamantia 
Pollis and Peter Schwab, eds., Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (New 
York: Praeger, 1979), 116-118; Asmarom Legesse, "Human Rights in African Political 
Culture," in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., The Moral Imperatives of Human Rights: A 
World Survey (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), 125-128; and Chris 
C. Mojekwu, "International Human Rights: The African Perspective," in Jack L. Nelson and 
Vera M. Green, eds., International Human Rights: Contemporary Issues (Stanfordville, 
N.Y.: Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980), 85-87. [Editor's note: but see Okere, note 
14 above.] 
48. E.g., Constitutions of Gambia (1970), Ghana (1979), Kenya (1969), Nigeria (1979), Sierra 
Leone (1978), Uganda (1967), and Zambia (1973), in Blaustein and Flanz, note 38 above. 
The Tanzanian (1977) and Malawian (1966) Constitutions do not list fundamental rights 
and freedoms. 
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zation, even in the modernized economic sectors and urban areas. I call this 
model of precolonial African society the communitarian ideal.49 
The communitarian ideal asserts that African social organization dif- 
fered, and still differs, from the Western world in three crucial respects. The 
first is that people do not think of themselves as individuals, nor do they 
worry about individual rights; rather, personhood is attained by fulfilling 
one's role in the community, and people are more concerned with group, 
especially ethnic-cultural, than with individual rights.50 The second respect is 
that political decisions are made through group consensus, the chief con- 
sulting the elders who in turn represent the people; hence the competitive 
model of party politics is inappropriate and the concept of "loyal opposition" 
is incomprehensible; all loyal members are part of the group and opponents 
are by definition not loyal. The final respect in which African social organiza- 
tion differs from the Western is economic: in precolonial and present-day 
Africa, wealth is automatically redistributed; there is no concept of private 
property, and the wealthy man is respected only if he shares his good for- 
tune with his kin and coethnics. 
It is true that in many of the relatively homogeneous, undifferentiated 
simple societies of precolonial Africa, both economic and political "rights" 
were guaranteed, at least at the local level, by communal structures. Obliga- 
tions to family and kin ensured sharing of resources, however scarce. Land 
was distributed on the basis of need: even domestic slaves were allocated 
land to support themselves. Even after a great deal of social change, this pat- 
tern of resource distribution and family-based sharing continues in contem- 
porary Africa. Nepotistic corruption and patron-client relations are a form of 
wealth-sharing; national and local governments' resources are distributed by 
government or bureaucratic officials along ascriptive kin, ethnic, and 
language criteria. Wealthier urban migrants remit earnings to their families 
and invest in self-help projects in rural areas. Redistribution of resources is 
still a potent social ideal. 
Similarly on the civil and political level, many of the nondifferentiated, 
ethnically homogeneous societies of rural Africa had effective means for 
guaranteeing what is now known as human rights. In those societies in 
which centralized state structures had not evolved before European con- 
quest, chiefs were selected by and were accountable to tribal elders; and 
large, village-level meetings in which free speech was allowed were com- 
49. I discuss this ideal thoroughly in Rhoda Howard, "Is There an African Concept of Human 
Rights?"; Working Paper no. A:8, Development Studies Programme, University of 
Toronto; also in R. J. Vincent, ed., Human Rights and Sovereignty: Issues and Responses 
(under review by George Allen and Unwin, London). 
50. Ifeanyi A. Menkiti, "Person and Community in African Traditional Thought," in Richard A. 
Wright, ed., African Philosophy: An Introduction, 2d. ed. (Washington, D.C.: University 
Press of America, 1979), 157-168. 
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monplace.51 The courts operated on the basis of common sense morality 
rather than formal legal procedures; 52 this was an effective means of 
regulating social relations in societies in which all individuals were known to 
the judges and in which the question to be resolved in a trial was normally 
not whether the accused had committed a crime, but rather what his just 
punishment should be. 
The existence of these indigenous political and legal structures, which 
do indeed guarantee fair play, is often invoked by African political leaders to 
justify their own national political practices. For example, Tanzania refers 
back to the consensual model of politics to justify reliance on political 
mobilization and discussion within a single political party rather than having 
a formally competitive multiparty system. Malawi justifies its use of so-called 
Traditional Courts, which disallow defense attorneys even though the courts 
exercise the power of capital punishment in murder and treason trials,53 by 
referring back to indigenous models of community-based, relatively informal 
systems of popular justice. The new Rawlings regime in Ghana (1982- ) 
uses a similar justification for its new People's Courts 54 even though some 
critics maintain that the judges in these new courts are not traditional chiefs 
and elders, but rather young pro-Rawlings thugs.55 
Elsewhere I have criticized in some depth 56 the elevation of Africa's 
communitarian social structure to a unique ideal of human rights. The com- 
munal society does not exist in urban areas and is increasingly breaking 
down in the rural areas as well, as national political culture evolves and as 
economic resources, especially land, become more and more scarce. Con- 
stant references to communal society can be, and are, used to mask 
systematic violations of human rights in the interests of ruling elites. 
Moreover, the picture of precolonial African social relations on which 
the communal model is based is inaccurate even regarding the past. Some 
African societies, such as the Northern Nigerian Emirates and Buganda, 
were actually powerful empires in which there was social stratification 
51. See, for example, the account by K. A. Busia of Ashanti practices, in his Africa in Search of 
Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1967), 22-30. 
52. On traditional African legal systems, see James C. N. Paul, "Human Rights and Legal 
Development: Observations on Some African Experiences," in James C. Tuttle, ed., Inter- 
national Human Rights Law and Practice (Chicago: American Bar Association, August 
1978), 23-37. 
53. "Malawi - Criminal Jurisdiction," The Review of the International Commission of Jurists (March 1970), 6-7, and "Malawi," id. (June 1982), 13-14. See also various Amnesty Inter- 
national reports on Malawi, e.g., Amnesty International, Bulletin (Canada) (March 1977).1 
54. See West Africa, various 1982 reports, including "People's Court at Work" (18 October 
1982), 2703, 2705-06, and "Bar's Boycott [of People's Courts] Bites" (25 October 1982), 
2772-75. 
55. Communique issued by the Ghana Catholic Bishop's Conference (Wa, Upper Region; 
5-10 July 1982), reprinted in The Standard (Accra) (1 August 1982), 4. 
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among nobles, freemen, and slaves and in which political structures were 
relatively authoritarian. More to the point, the model now applies only to 
those hinterland parts of African countries which are still relatively 
unintegrated into the peripheral capitalist economy. National economic 
policies are based more and more on individual acquisition of wealth; 
political decisions are made more and more by elites with only ritualistic 
consultation of the masses; and people think of themselves more and more 
as individuals with varying wants and needs, not merely as members of their 
natal ethnic groups or villages. 
Some African scholars present the communitarian ideal as a model of 
social relations which is specifically African in content; thus they argue for 
cultural specificity on a racial or regional basis. In fact, however, the model 
is not confined to Africa; rather, it represents typical agrarian, precapitalist 
social relations in nonstate societies. It would be useful, for example, to 
compare such African societies with preindustrial England. Undoubtedly, in 
the closed-village societies of premodern Europe, we would also discover 
that people thought of themselves more as members of their own local 
groups than as individuals, finding a sense of identity by fulfilling their 
assigned roles rather than by fulfilling "themselves." A counterpoint to the 
feeling of belongingness would be hostility to strangers, such as outside 
traders or Jews, just as it is in African societies with their "Zongos," or 
strangers' quarters. In the feudal system, the lords took some responsibility 
for storage of grain and protection from famine, just as the chiefs were 
responsible for redistributing food and allocating land in precolonial Africa. 
I do not wish to stretch the comparison too far: feudal Europe and 
precolonial Africa are not altogether arialagous. The point, however, is that 
both were relatively simple social structures. What some writers view as 
essentially different African and Western social structures and ways of think- 
ing are actually differences between relatively simple and relatively complex 
societies."7 In simple societies, there is little social stratification, so that it is 
easy to have consensual decision-making and redistribution of wealth; there 
are no economic classes competing against each other for scarce resources. 
Moreover, social roles are undifferentiated; the villager who fulfills his role as 
husband is also fulfilling his role as farmer and as respected man in the com- 
munity. But in more complex societies the roles of husband, economic man, 
and political man are differentiated; and the individual is likely to compart- 
mentalize himself, having different associational ties for each role. Thus in 
politics he has more than one interest and cannot easily rely on a commu- 
nity leader to express all his interests for him. Finally, in more complex 
societies, the different functions of authority, such as law, government, 
57. The sociological originator of the distinction between simple and complex societies is 
Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York: The Free Press, 1933; 1st 
ed. 1893). 
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police, defense, administration, education, and social welfare, are compart- 
mentalized and bureaucratized. The individual is confronted with new 
organizations operating by impersonal rule, not by friendly personal contact. 
His own life becomes compartmentalized insofar as he must deal with dif- 
ferent institutions for different aspects of his needs and wants. Modern man, 
then, becomes individualized, fragmented, and cut off from community 
ties.18 
Thus comparison with precolonial Africa is of limited use, if any, insofar 
as it purports to provide us with an alternative, culturally specific model of 
human rights indigenous to Africa or Africans. It is useful, however, as a 
reminder of the kind of society in which many rural Africans still live, despite 
the increasing institutional ubiquity of the centralized modern state and of 
the kind of society in which many urban and rural elite Africans still have 
very real roots. The elite spokesperson who maintains that Africans are not 
so competitive, profit-seeking, and individualistic as North Americans may 
be correct, not because Africans are African but because their social organi- 
zation is still less complex and less institutionally differentiated than that of 
the Western industrial world. To base human rights policy on this model of 
rural Africa, however, is to ignore the changes which have occurred and are 
occurring in the way Africans live, in particular how their lives are affected 
by all those institutions that the state controls. Under such new social condi- 
tions, new methods of guaranteeing human rights become essential. Com- 
parison with precolonial society is useful insofar as it explains the cultural 
and psychological roots of modern African man, but it is not useful if it is 
taken as a factual description of contemporary African social organization. 
CONCLUSION 
I began this article by suggesting that commentators on human rights in 
Africa, or indeed anywhere in the world, need to be aware of the implicit 
comparisons they make regarding guarantees, implementations, and abuses 
of human rights. It is important to be aware and critical of one's implicit com- 
parisons. 
The use of comparisons themselves, however, is not only a legitimate 
but indeed, I would contend, a necessary part of analyzing human rights. 
Ultimately, human rights practices are based not in law or philosophy, but in 
real social relations. Such social relations vary across time and place, across 
history and culture. By looking at human rights in a comparative framework, 
one can obtain a sense of how human rights practices can or may change: 
one can predict what human rights violations may be remedied or may arise, 
58. See Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, The Homeless Mind: Moderniza- 
tion and Consciousness (New York: Vintage Books, 1973). 
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rather than merely engage in static description or in post hoc analysis. Com- 
parisons ought to be historical, not merely in a temporal but, more impor- 
tantly, in a social sense. Social chronology implies comparing societies at 
similar stages of development. This does not mean that one ought to be an 
evolutionist, assuming that all societies evolve through exactly the same 
stages in an orderly, and inevitable, progression. It does mean that one 
ought to try to compare societies with similar levels of wealth or in similar 
stages of economic development, taking into account also similarities in the 
level of national consolidation and institution-building. 
An historical sense also means that one will be aware that no society is 
static. The harkening back to precolonial Africa that is typical of a number of 
Africans commenting on human rights in their own continent implies an 
essentially ahistorical approach. All societies change. Africa, as a result of 
five centuries of incorporation into the world economy and one century of 
colonial conquest and control, has changed more than most. To present a 
static picture of communal relations which may have existed in some parts 
of Africa before contact with Europe began, as a model for contemporary 
human rights in Africa, is to deny history completely. 
Historical comparisons must be combined with a sense of social struc- 
ture. Whether one compares societies at the same or different times, one is 
comparing social structures. Contentions that human rights beliefs are 
specific to particular places (the West, Africa) should not be interpreted as 
evidence of differing racial or geographical philosophies. Rather, they repre- 
sent the reflection of different social structures in different belief systems. 
Although parallels between different social entities can never be exact, we 
can find substantial similarities in human rights beliefs and practices in the 
simple, nondifferentiated societies of premodern Europe and precolonial 
Africa. The communal model of social relations, insofar as it actually exists, is 
not unique to Africa. 
In insisting on the necessity of historically and structurally accurate com- 
parisons, however, I do not mean to deny the independent role of ideas and 
ideals in shaping any society's view of human rights. People can and do act 
independently of history. Any prediction based on social scientific analysis 
can fall flat because of how people act, and how people act is often deter- 
mined by the ideas they hold dear, even when those ideas may seem inap- 
propriate, in a scientific sense, to their time and place. In Africa the indepen- 
dent role of ideas is more obvious than in Europe. Whereas Europe has been 
an originator of modern ideologies, Africa has been to a large extent a 
(sometimes unwilling) recipient. African politicians, philosophers, and 
lawyers have all been influenced by the Christian religion and by liberal 
political and judicial ideals which the British introduced into their colonies, 
even when the British practice fell far short of Britain's own ideals. In more 
recent times, African intellectuals and other members of the elite have been 
influenced by both the socialist view of human rights and the emerging inter- 
Evaluating Human Rights in Africa 179 
national consensus on human rights reflected in the various U.N. standards 
as well as in Africa's own Rights Charter. Ideas, transformed into fact by 
human actors endowed with free will, can challenge and overcome both 
structural constraints and historical "inevitability." 
Individuals are not, of course, mere agents of history or victims of social 
structure, nor are they mere implementers of ideas. Individuals are also 
selfish human beings, who normally act in a rational manner calculated to 
achieve their own self-interest. In some societies, including many in 
precolonial Africa, an individual's self-interest is perceived to be best 
guaranteed by conformity to group norms and by acting in concern with the 
group. But in contemporary Africa, in rural as well as urban areas, it is 
increasingly the case that the individual both separates himself from the 
group and can no longer rely on a particular group leader to represent him 
in the multiplicity of his relations with the modern economy and the new 
state structure. He then begins to represent himself in the new competitive 
economic and political marketplace. Inevitably, a few individuals rise to the 
top in this new competitive society. 
In Africa, as elsewhere, therefore, new elites are forming as hundreds of 
millions of individuals pursue their own self-interest. There is nothing new or 
surprising about this; all historical and structural comparisons will lead to the 
conclusion that in all but the most primitive of societies, social stratification 
occurs and elites dominate. In the African as in all other contexts, the exis- 
tence of elites implies the possibility of elite manipulations of human rights in 
their own interests. Such elites may enunciate a specifically "African" theory 
of human rights merely as a legitimizing ideology,59 a cover for their own 
interests. Thus, for example, the denial of a concept of loyal opposition in 
African cultural history can become an excuse for holding political dissidents 
in preventive detention. 
The use of historical and structural comparisons can assist the analyst in 
separating what is actually possible from what is merely the ideal in the prac- 
tice of human rights. This is an important distinction to make, especially in 
newly independent, poor countries such as English-speaking sub-Saharan 
Africa. But men make history, and elites can control men. Scientific com- 
parisons may be used as explanations, but should never be used as excuses, 
for human rights abuses. The Nigerian writer Wole Soyinka speaks of "power 
morality." 60 Power morality is undoubtedly the most enduring enemy of real 
human rights, in Africa as elsewhere. 
59. Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Harlow: Longman, 1981), 180. 
60. Wole Soyinka, The Man Died (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 90. 
